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It may be presumed, therefore, that the bailor will allow the bailee to
act on his behalf only after he is assured that the bailee will carry on
with the utmost consideration, in respect to the bailor's interest in
the property. If perchance, the bailee, after consent is given, acts in
a manner detrimental to the bailor, the answer will not be that a rule
of law, but rather that the bailor's own act denied him the consideration to which he is entitled. If the bailor does not consent to the
bailee's suit, there is no problem. The bailor will then pursue his
own remedies and he cannot complain of his own deeds whatever
their consequences. But what of the wrongdoer? This suggestion
involves the possibility of two suits against him. Is it not more efficient for the administration of justice and more just to the wrongdoer
to settle the matter in one action? There is undoubtedly merit in
these contentions. They are counterbalanced, however, when we
realize the inadequate consideration given to the bailor under the
present principle and that if it were not for the wrongdoer's action,
we would have no problem. Moreover, the policy of eliminating
multiplicity of suits whenever possible should not be extended to
situations wherein one party may be harmed by its enforcement.
It is apparent that this latter recommendation effectually solves
our problem. The introduction of this prerequisite to the bailee's
commencement of an action for full damages when he is not liable
would produce the resultant effect we are seeking; namely, the full
protection of the bailor's interest.

PROBLEMS OF THE INVENTOR UNDER THE AToMIc ENERGY ACT

Introduction
A strange phenomenom of the so-called Atomic Age is that the
Atomic Energy Act itself has received so little public discussion.1
The Act is a relatively radical departure from the precepts normally
followed in government activities.2 A huge and powerful government organization is created and private activity in the same field is
proscribed.3 Private possession of more than a trifling amount of
the source materials of atomic energy is forbidden unless under
government license for research or medical purposes. 4 Even then
I See Marks. The Atomic Energy Act: Public Administration Without
Public Debate, 15 U. OF Car. L. Rin. 809 (1948). Mr. Marks was General
Counsel of the Atomic Energy Commission.
2 See Miller, A Law is Passed-The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 15 U. OF
CHI. L. REv. 799 (1948).
3 60 STAT. 759, 42 U. S. C. A. 1804(b) (Supp. 1949).
460 STAr. 760, 42 U. S. C. A. 1805(a) (Supp. 1949).
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virtually every grain must be accounted for.5 The Atomic Energy
Commission has been discussed as an island of socialism, 6 presumably on the sea of free enterprise. Yet the apathy of the public has
been remarkable, except
insofar as personalities and security ques7
tions are concerned.
The patent provisions of the act have perhaps been argued more
than any specific sections other than those relating to civilian control."
They are possibly the most extreme diversion of the patent law
ever made in this country,9 and they deserve comment, particularly
from the viewpoint of the inventor who has not yet obtained a patent.
The Patent Provisions of the Act
The patent right is only a negative one: the right to exclude
others from making, using or selling the patented invention. 10 Since,
under the Act there is to be no private ownership of the materiel of2
atomic energy," the patent right has no application in this field.'
The Act prohibits and revokes any patent rights so far as the invention is useful either in the production of fissionable materials or in
their utilization in military weapons.' 3 To the extent which such
inventions are in fact used for these purposes, the owner of the invention is entitled to just compensation.' 4 If a patented invention is
useful solely for either of these purposes, for example, the bomb
itself, the patent is revoked and just compensation is made therefor. 15
In addition, any person who makes an invention useful for these
purposes is required to file a report and description of it with the
Atomic Energy Commission within sixty days, unless he has filed a
patent application within that time.' 6 The sixty-day period runs
either from the completion of the invention,' 7 or from the date on
5 11 CODE FED. REG. §§ 40.1-40.62 (Cur. Supp. 1949).
6Cohen, A Re-examination of the McMahon Act, 4 BuLL. ATo
TxISs

7 (Jan. 1948).

(July 26, 1946).

See also 92

CONG.

Ic SCIEN-

RC.9389-90 (July 17, 1946), 10326-31

For example, the extended investigation by the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the so-called Hickenlooper investigation, June 26
through July 11, 1949.
892 CONG. REc. 6190 et seq. (June 1 to July 29, 1946). See also Miller,
supra note 2, at 816.
9 See Note, Atomic Energy Provisions and the American Economy, 97 U.
OF PA. L. REV. 389 (1949).

10 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405

(1908).

11 See note 3 supra.
12 See Ooms, Patent Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 15 U. OF CHI.
L. REv. 822 (1948)

13 60 STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. 1811 (a) (1), (2) (Supp. 1949).
1460 STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. 1811(a) (2) (Supp. 1949).
1s60 STAT.768, 42 U. S. C. A. 1811(a) (1) (Supp. 1949).
16 60 STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. 1811(a) (3) (Supp. 1949).
0
17 The "completion" of an invention requires in patent law a reduction to
practice, actual or constructive. Automatic Weighing Machine Co. v. Pneu-
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which the inventor determines that it is useful in these fields. Failure
to report is penalized by forfeiture of the right to an award under the
Act.' 8 If a patent application is filed, the Commissioner of Patents
must notify the Atomic Energy Commission. 9 To effect this end,
the Commissioner of Patents has established a special file on atomic
energy within the Patent Office.20
It is notable that the Act places virtually no restriction on the
definition of the inventions which are affected by the foregoing provisions. It is required only that such an invention be "useful" in the
production of fissionable material or in the utilization of a military
weapon. Presumably the absence of definition is for the purpose of
including the incidental paraphernalia needed for the functioning of
an industry of such size. If this interpretation be followed, 21 the
Act embraces instruments, chemical processes and equipment, special
hardware and tools, indeed all the varied equipment and methods required for the Commission's vast and unique activities. However,
if such inventions are used, the inventor must be compensated.
To award payment for the rights lost, the Act establishes a
Patent Compensation Board.2 2 This board is empowered to hear
applications for awards, for just compensation or for reasonable
royalty fees. Representation by counsel is guaranteed, 23 and appeal
from the final order of the Board may be taken to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.2 4 In making its determination,
the Board is to consider any defenses which may be pleaded by the
defendant in an infringement suit,25 including lack of novelty of the

invention.
In carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission has established the Patent Compensation Board 26 which, up to this time, has
heard and rejected two applications for compensation.2 7 Five other
applications were pending on March 31, 1950.28

Beyond this, the

matic Scale Corp., 166 Fed. 288 (1st Cir. 1909). Obviously, in view of the
Government's ownership of the raw materials and the equipment of atomic
energy, an actual reduction to practice will, in many cases, be impossible. A
better interpretation of "completion" might be complete conception. But cf.
supra note 9, at 400, n. 77.
:1860 STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. 1811(e) (2) (C) (Supp. 1949).
1960 STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. 1811(d) (Supp. 1949).
20
Report of the Commission's Patent Advisory Panel, p. 46 (1947).
21 See Ooms, supra note 12.
2260 STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. 1811(e) (1) (Supp. 1949).
23 60 STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. 1811(e) (2) (D) (Supp. 1949).
24 60 STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. 1811(e) (4) (Supp. 1949).
25 60 STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. 1811(e) (3) (A) (Supp. 1949).
26 11 CoDE FED. REG. § 80 (1948).
The members are Caspar W. Ooms,
Chairman and former Commissioner of Patents, John V. L. Hogan and Isaac
Harter.
27 In re Fulmer, 85 U. S. PATENT QUARTERLY 116 (1950) ; In re Fletcher
and Fletcher, 84 U. S. PATENT QUARTERLY 386 (1950).
28

Boskey, Inventions and the Atom, 50 COL. L. Rv. 433, at 438, n. 17

(1950).

Mr. Boskey is on the staff of the Commission's General Counsel.
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Commission maintains an active Patent Branch whose principal function is to review the technical work of the Commission's laboratories
and those of its contractors, and file and prosecute patent applications.20
The filing of patent applications by the Commission serves two
purposes. The filing itself constitutes a constructive reduction to
practice and is available as a defense against claims of private parties
and of foreign governments. Further, since these inventions are
made with public funds, and title to them is in the government, they
may be made available on an equal basis to all.30 It may be that the
evidentiary advantage of filing can be gained by some other method
than the tedious, complex and expensive prosecution required
for each patent application. It has been suggested3 1 that the filing
of an application (or report) in the Patent Office, without further
prosecution, might be sufficient. Perhaps the second purpose for
filing might be achieved (where security requirements permit) by
the recently instituted Patent Office practice of permitting publication in the Patent Office Gazette of an abstract of a patent application.3 2 Within a year after the publication, the application becomes
abandoned and the invention is then available for public use. However, if these methods are practiced, the Commission's control of the
sometimes dangerous activities related to atomic energy will necessarily be decreased. At present the Commission has at least some
discretion in the licensing of the patents it owns. In addition, the
ability to bargain with the owner of a needed patent on cross-licensing
terms would be lost.
The quid pro quo for the grant of the patent monopoly is the
disclosure of the invention made by the patent applicant. 33 Opposing
such disclosure is the effectiveness added to a weapon by concealment. While the existence of the atomic bomb is known, it is desirable at this time to keep its techniques concealed. The Act declares 34
that all information that concerns production and use of fissionable
materials both in industrial applications and in military weapons is
restricted data. Disclosure of such resticted data meets with heavy
penalties. The word "concerns" is emphasized because there is no
adequate definition of "restricted data," the definition being discretionary with the Commission. Under present conditions, the
patent system and the security provisions of the Act meet head on.
In addition, the field of application of the security provisions largely

29

Report of the Commission's Patent Advisory Panel, pp. 22-26 (1947).

3O Report of the Commission's Patent Advisory Panel, pp. 40-44 (1947).

The Commission has made 155 patents available for licensing on a non-exclusive,
royalty-free basis.
31 See Report of the Commission's Patent Advisory Panel, p. 43 (1947).
32 Commission's Order of January 25, 1949, 619 0. G. PAT. OFF. 258.
33 1 WALKER ON PATENTS 24-28 (Deller's ed. 1937).
3-160 STAT. 766, 42 U. S. C. A. 1810(b) (1) (Supp. 1949).
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encompasses the area in which patent rights are denied. This is the
area in which the Patent Compensation Board is to operate.
The conflict between the patent system as an incentive to disclosure and the secrecy requirements of military weapons is not new.
When a patent application is the property of the government, its
prosecution may be delayed for periods of three years on certification
that the invention is "important to the armament or defense of the
United States." ' In addition, if the disclosure of the invention
described in a filed patent application might be "detrimental to the
public safety or defense" in the opinion of the Commissioner of
Patents, he is empowered to keep the patent secret and prevent its
issue.3 6 This is acqomplished by serving the applicant with a
"Secrecy Order," the violation of which may result in a severe
punishment. In essence, the application may be impounded. This,
then, is the somewhat formidable array of special laws affecting the
inventor in the fields of atomic energy.
The Contractors of the Atomic Energy Commission
The scope of the patent rights available to the Commission's
contractors is, determined by the nature of the contractor's work.
However, in each case the Commission reserves the final decision
whether and where to file a patent application.37 While the Commission also has the right to dispose of the title to any patent which
may issue, its discretion is usually limited when the contractor has
an established position in his field and the inventions likely to be
made are of only indirect importance to the Commission's activities.
Normally then, any patent issued will be assigned to the United States
as represented by the Atomic Energy Commission. The limitation
placed on the Commission's right to dispose of the title is the retention of an outfield license 38 which may be exclusive if the inventions
likely to be made are in the usual developmental work of the contractor. The contractor is required to waive rights to an award
under the Act for inventions made under the contract and to obtain
patent agreements from his employees to effectuate the provisions of
as amended, 35 U. S. C. A. 37 (1940).
394 (1917), as amended, 35 U. S. C. A. 42 (1940).
37 See Report of the Commission's Patent Advisory Panel, Appendix A.
3529 STAT. 692 (1897),
3640 STAT.

The General Manager of the Commission has issued a policy manual. G.M.-100,
"Patent Articles in Contracts, Sub-contracts and Purchase Orders." This

manual contains a guide for classifying contracts according to the types of
patent article to be included. The Commission's policy in this respect is also
discussed in the Fifth Semi-Annual Report of the Commission, 148-51 (1949).
At their meeting in Washington, the American Bar Association's Section of
Patent, Trade Mark and Copyright Law recommended disapproval of the
Commission's policy. 86 U. S. PATENT QUARTERLY, Number 10, Part I, p. III
(September 23, 1950).
38 An outfield license permits practice of the invention for purposes other
than those of the Commission, i.e., outside the field of atomic energy.
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the contract. The inventor-employee under this arrangement has no
difficulty in disposing of an invention made during the contract
period. The property in the patent is distributed as the Commission determines, subject of course to the contract.
After the term of the contract, however, the employee is in a
somewhat different situation. While employed by the contractor, he
is bound to assign inventions he was hired to make.89 If the employment is general, there is no duty to assign.40 Most patent-conscious
commercial organizations require the assignment of all inventions
made in the course of employment as a part of the employment contract.41 Many require the assignment of inventions made within a
limited period after employment is terminated.4 2 Such agreements
may be in addition to, or the same as the agreement under the contract with the Commission. 43 Since these agreements may be
in force after the termination of the contract, the contractor may
become the owner of an invention within the proscribed fields defined
in the Act. The contractor will then be in the same position as a
former employee of the Commission or of the contractor.
Employees of the Atomic Energy Commission
The direct employees of the Commission are bound by patent
agreements to assign their inventions to the Commission.4 4 In this
the Commission follows the usual commercial practices and the recently instituted practice in many Government departments.45 It is
not until the employment is terminated that any problem arises.
I
A particular problem of the inventors who have been associated
with the Commission as direct or contractor-employees is posed by
a phrase in Section 1811(e) (3) of the Act. In determining the
compensation to be awarded, the Patent Compensation Board is to
consider the "extent to which [the invention] was developed through
39 Standard Parts Company v. Peck, 264 U. S. 52 (1924).
40
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U. S.178 (1933).
41 See Cornfeld, The Employer-Employee Relation in Patent Law, 32 J.PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 345 (1950); Knoth, Assignments of Future Inventions, Particularly as Between Employers and Employees, 31 J.PAT. OFF. So&Y 532 (1949).
42 See Knoth, supra note 41.
43
Employee patent agreements under a Commission contract are subject to
approval by the Commission's Patent Branch. Report of the Commission's
Patent Advisory Panel, p. 24 (1947).
44 Report of the Commission's Patent Advisory Panel, p. 23 (1947).
-5Exec. Order, January 23, 1950, 15 CODE FFE. REG. § 389 (1950). This
order requires an absolute assignment of all inventions "made by any Government employee (1) during working hours, or (2) with a contribution by Government of facilities, equipment, materials, funds or information, or of time or
services of other Government employees on official duty, or (3) which bear a
direct relation to or are made in consequence of the official duties of the
inventor." This is obviously a more stringent policy toward contractors than
that pursued by the Commission, which is not affected by the order.
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federally financed research." 46 Most of the Commission's activities
have been carried out in complete secrecy. Accordingly, the information, and usually the training, necessary to make an invention in this
field, can be said to have been obtained through "federally financed
research." This may offer the Commission at least a partial defense
to the claim of such an inventor. 47 The information is available
nowhere else. Aside from this provision, the position of the former
associate of the Commission is much the same as that of the newcomer to the field.
Inventors Unassociated with the Commission
When a person not associated with the Commission has made
an invention useful in the specific fields enumerated in the Atomic
Energy Act, he is confronted immediately with the problem of selling it. He cannot enter the business of producing fissionable materials
or of making atomic bombs. His only customer is the Atomic
Energy Commission. He may be unable to obtain a patent because
the invention is useful only in the production of a fissionable material
or in its utilization in an atomic bomb. For this, there is no right
to compensation. 48 If the Commission uses the invention, the owner
of it may either reach agreement with the Commission on his compensation or he may apply for an award before the Patent Compensation Board. Otherwise he has no recourse, and this is so whether
the invention is solely or only incidentally useful in the fields preempted. Of course, in the latter event, sale of the invention may be
made to others, provided it does not fall into the category of restricted
data.
Having met the requirements for an application before the Patent
Compensation Board, 49 the inventor faces the companion hurdles of
"restricted data" and "just compensation." Proof of the extent to
which many inventions are used by the Commission must often depend at least partially on restricted data. Whether this will require
security clearance in every case for the applicant, his counsel, and so
on, is doubtful. Certainly there will be at least a small number of
cases which absolutely require access to restricted data. Thus, the
inventor may find it difficult or impossible to obtain access to the very
46 60 STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. 1811(e) (3) (Supp. 1949).
Compare the
provisions of the Executive Order of January 23, 1950, supra note 45.
47 Cf. Dreckscbmidt v. Schaefer et al., 46 App. D. C. 295, 246 0. G. PAT.
OFF. 301 (1917); Stresau v. Ipsen, 77 F. 2d 937 (C. C. P. A. 1935). The
defense raised is similar to the defense of possibility of derivation in a patent
interference proceeding.
48 The second sentence of 42 U. S. C. A. 1811(a) (1) is: "Any Patent for
any such invention or discovery is hereby revoked, and just compensation shall
be made therefor." (Emphasis added.) Only patents granted prior to the Act
are affected.
4960 STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. 1811(e) (2) (Supp. 1949).
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data necessary to prove the value of his inventions or even that it
has been used. The Government is permitted to withhold 'evidence detrimental to national security. 0 Some suggestions to remedy
this problem have been made; for example, an in camera type of proceeding."'
The problem of evaluating the invention is an equally difficult
one. While the question "how much is an atomic bomb worth?" is
hardly indicative of the problem to be faced, the complexities of fixing
a price are certain to be great. The entire industry is so new, its
methods and equipment so different,5 2 that a standard for reasonable
payment will be difficult to establish. There is no, basis for comparison. Perhaps cost accounting procedures will be of some assistance in weighing improvement inventions. The wisdom of a Solomon
will be needed in evaluating basic inventions.
Conclusion
This summary is far from being a complete catalog of the problems of the inventor in the field of atomic energy. The Atomic
Energy Act has, if nothing else, increased the complexity of the
already intricate patent law. Perhaps the Act serves best as an
illustration of a law of physics, that, to every action, there is an opposite reaction. Technology has spawned the atomic industry, and in
return, technology has had its own traditions imposed upon.

THE RIGHT OF A SURVIVING SPOUSE TO ATTACK AN ILLUSORY
TRANSFER -

TOTTEN TRUSTS

When the common law rights of dower and curtesy were
abolished in New York State,' Section 18 of the Decedent Estate
Law was enacted with the intent and purpose of increasing the interest of a surviving spouse in the property of the deceased. In the
place of these former rights, the survivor was given a personal right
of election to take his or her share as in intestacy against, or in the
absence of, a provision in the testator's will. This section, amounting, in effect, to a statutory limitation on the power of an owner of
50 Pollen v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 673, 58 F. Supp. 653 (1937) ; 62 STAT.
977, 28 U. S. C. 2507 (1948).
51 Boskey, supra note 28, at 445-6.
52 For an illustration of the complicating factors, see the Commission's
Eighth Semi-Annual Report, pp. 3-161 (1950).
iN. Y. REAL PRoPPRTY LAW §§ 189, 190.

